There is much relief as quiet finally returns to
Pathankot. However, the immediate questions that need to be asked are
about the way the security operation was carried out from the moment a
specific intelligence alert came to the Centre about the possible
targeting of the Pathankot airbase. This newspaper has already reported
that by Christmas, a foreign intelligence agency had passed on a tip-off
about terrorists planning to attack the base. Was that not treated with
seriousness because most intelligence alerts do not mean anything? Is
the response a reflection of the poor quality of general intelligence
alerts? On January 1, early morning, the abducted Superintendent of
Police, Salwinder Singh, reported to the local police that his vehicle
had been snatched. By afternoon, the government at the Centre had
confirmation about the presence of terrorists in Pathankot. What the
security establishment did from that moment raises several questions. A
meeting chaired by the National Security Adviser and attended by, among
others, the chiefs of the Army and the Air Force, decided to rush NSG
commandos from Delhi. How did they take that decision, when it was clear
that an airbase had to be protected and terrorists could be anywhere in
the district? Does this reflect the poor thinking of senior members of
the security establishment? Or does it hint at autocratic
decision-making in New Delhi without professional participation?
Over
the last few days, the government has been making a desperate effort to
defend the course of action that was followed in fighting terrorists.
From informal briefings in New Delhi to the formal briefing on Wednesday
evening by Lt. Gen. K.J. Singh, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief,
Western Command, the government has been putting up a spirited defence
of the operations. Gen. Singh admitted that the first to react to the
terrorists were the DSC (Defence Security Corps) and Garuds, but added
that the second contact was the Army columns. As Defence Minister
Manohar Parrikar did on Tuesday, Gen. Singh claimed that there was total
operational synergy, and he justified the time taken by saying that
forces had to be applied sequentially, and not simultaneously, and they
were also careful to avoid a hostage situation and other eventualities.
However, all this does not answer the basic criticism by military
veterans and security experts: despite the Pathankot airbase being at
shouting distance from thousands of Army soldiers trained to deal with
terrorists, why were they not even called in to provide perimeter
security to the base? What was the need to send the NSG into a military
installation where the Army’s para commandos and quick reaction teams
would have been more familiar with the terrain? Why was the operational
command not handed over to the senior-most Army commander on the ground?
The answers should not only inform decisions to hold those responsible
accountable for the mis-step in operations, but also lead to an upgrade
of existing protocols.
Source:- The Hindu, 07-Jan-2016
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